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On 15 February 2018, the Hawks confirmed 
that a warrant for the arrest of Ajay Gupta 
By virtue of state sovereignty, states exercise authority over all persons and things within their 
territories. This includes individuals suspected of committing or charged with crimes in foreign states. 
International law generally imposes no obligation to surrender individuals suspected of or charged 
with committing crimes in foreign states. Fugitives may only be returned when an agreement exists 
between the states concerned. As such, states are increasingly ratifying international treaties 
mandating cooperation to ensure that individuals responsible for certain categories of crimes are 
brought to justice. It is worth noting that some of these states lack extradition treaties with each 
other. For example, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are party to the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) which mandates that they cooperate with each other in 
ensuring that crimes related to corruption are prosecuted. However, there is no extradition treaty 
between South Africa and the UAE. In these circumstances, a question arises as to whether they 
can they rely on the UNCAC to extradite individuals for corruption-related crimes. If they can, what is 
the nature of the international obligation entrenched under the UNCAC? Overall, what is the standing 
of international treaty clauses on extradition for states without extradition treaties? 
had been issued. Reports circulated 
that Ajay Gupta has fled South Africa... 
Subsequently it was suggested that if 
he has fled to Dubai in the United Arab 
Emirates [UAE], surrendering him in order 
to extradite him from Dubai to South Africa 
to stand trial for corruption would not be 
possible or feasible – because no bilateral 
extradition treaty is in force between SA 
and the UAE. However, that is not correct. 
Extradition between the UAE and SA may 
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not only be possible but compulsory for 
corruption-related matters […]. In the Gupta 
case, it is necessary to consider that both 
South Africa and the UAE have signed 
and ratified the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption […]. Article 44 of the UN 
Corruption Convention sets out the rules 
regarding extraditing those persons who are 
accused of corruption... If the law of a state 
party, such as the UAE, makes extradition 
dependent on the existence of a bilateral 
treaty and receives a request from another 
state party, such as South Africa, it may 
consider the UN Corruption Convention as 
the legal basis for extradition in respect of 
corruption type crimes.1
The above quote from the Daily Maverick 
may contain speculation, for example on the 
whereabouts of Ajay Gupta. The matter is 
still unfolding, which makes it difficult to draw 
conclusions, but it does illustrate the lack of 
clarity regarding extradition, particularly where 
states do not have bilateral treaties with each 
other, but both are parties to international 
treaties, which contain provisions on extradition.
As the quotation suggests, ‘if the law of a 
state party… makes extradition dependent 
on the existence of a bilateral treaty and 
receives a request from another state party, 
… it may consider the [UNCAC] as the legal 
basis for extradition in respect of corruption 
type crimes.’2 While this is indisputable, some 
issues remain far from clear. In this particular 
instance, the enforcement of the UNCAC 
may be faced with two obstacles. The first 
pertains to the status of the UNCAC in South 
Africa’s municipal law. There continues to be 
a debate on whether extradition treaties are 
self-executing.3 Some constitutions, including 
South Africa’s, contain provisions on the self-
executing nature of some international treaties.4 
What then is the implication of this debate for 
South Africa, bearing in mind provisions such as 
section 231 of the Constitution, which make it 
explicit that international agreements become law 
in South Africa when they are ‘enacted into law 
by national legislation?’ Secondly, although some 
states are party to international treaties, such 
as the UNCAC, they have made reservations to 
the section on extradition. With regards to such 
states, the prospects of South Africa relying 
on the UNCAC would appear to ring hollow. In 
light of these issues, the purpose of this article 
is to critically analyse the status of provisions on 
extradition as contained in international treaties 
in South Africa’s municipal law. This discussion 
will demonstrate that, despite provisions on 
self-execution of treaties in South Africa’s 
Constitution, domestic implementation of 
extradition provisions in treaties is not simple. To 
appreciate the argument advanced in this paper, 
it is necessary to undertake an overview of the 
notion of extradition and state sovereignty.
General rules on extradition in light of 
the notion of state sovereignty
Extradition may be defined as the delivery of an 
accused or convicted person to the state where 
he is accused of, or has been convicted of, a 
crime by the state in which he is resident at the 
time.5 The extradition process of South Africa is 
primarily governed by the Extradition Act 67 of 
1962. Under this Act, extradition takes place only 
by way of an agreement between states.6 The 
Constitutional Court, in the case of The President 
of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Nello 
Quagliani and others (Quagliani 2),7 has described 
the notion of extradition as follows: ‘[i]t involves… 
acts of sovereignty on the part of two States; 
a request by one State to another … and the 
delivery of the person requested...8 International 
law allows each state liberty to exercise control 
on matters within its territory and this includes 
matters pertaining to extradition. This is rooted in 
the principle of sovereignty of states. 
33SA CRIME QUARTERLY NO. 67 • MARCH 2019
Kelsen defines state sovereignty as a state’s 
legal independence from other states.9 As such, 
no state has a right to dictate or command any 
state to take any particular action. Being one of 
the fundamental principles of international law, 
sovereignty is considered a crucial principle in 
the shaping of international law.10 The notion of 
sovereignty also finds force in article 2(7) of the 
UN Charter,11 which protects matters that are 
within the domestic jurisdiction of a state from 
any external interference. This notion comes 
into play when another state is interested in 
the person of the accused within the territory 
of another state. Here the rights or interests of 
two states converge as they both are interested 
in the accused – one state’s interests emanate 
from the accused’s presence, whereas the 
other’s interests originate from the act of crime 
committed within its jurisdiction or territory. 
Usually in the absence of an extradition treaty, 
states are not obliged to surrender an alleged 
criminal to a foreign state due to the principle 
of sovereignty.12 This has been the norm under 
international law. It is no wonder then that the 
court, in Factor v Lanbenheimer,13 emphasised 
that no right in international law is recognised in 
extradition, apart from a treaty. 
Despite the notion of sovereignty, the 
development of international law has brought 
some changes to the absolute sovereignty of 
states. This is attributed largely to globalisation, 
which fosters interdependence and co-
operation between states.14 Sovereignty is 
sometimes seen to be undermined where an 
extradition treaty is in existence when the state 
to which the request is being made cannot 
extradite due to the likelihood of death sentence 
being executed on the wanted person. This 
was seen in the case of Tsebe and Another 
v Minister of Home Affairs and Others, Phale 
v Minister of Home Affairs and Others15 
where Botswana’s sovereign right to make 
laws applicable and be able to execute them 
(sentencing the accused to death) was limited 
by South Africa’s need to respect its own laws 
within the territory under its sovereignty (i.e. within 
the borders of South Africa). In this instance, 
to evade the death penalty in Botswana, the 
accused had fled to within the borders of South 
Africa. South Africa is bound by its Constitution 
to protect every person within its territory, 
including protecting them from any inhumane and 
degrading punishment, which is, inter alia, how 
the Constitutional Court viewed a death sentence 
in S v Makwanyane and Another.16 Other legal 
factors like the universality of human rights 
also limit state sovereignty. Different scholars 
underscore the need for reforms to the concept 
of sovereignty in line with recent developments. 
For instance, Fassbender contends that since 
sovereignty may be considered an umbrella term 
demonstrating rights and duties afforded to a 
state by international law at a given time, it is 
essential that it be highly flexible and adaptive.17 
Ferreira-Snyman adds that sovereignty is neither 
‘natural’ nor static.18 Bodley submits that the fact 
that states are sovereign does not suggest that 
international law does not bind them.19 A state 
that signs an extradition treaty may be viewed 
as ceding or voluntarily giving up a portion of its 
sovereignty.20 Strydom contends that ‘sovereignty 
is always legally circumscribed, internally by 
the law of the state, and externally by the legal 
claims that other states are entitled to as equal 
members of the international legal order’.21 
Bearing this in mind, the question that arises in 
relation to extradition in the absence of treaties 
may be whether or not a state may be compelled 
to extradite an alleged criminal. In other words, 
whether there is a duty to extradite. And if 
such a duty exists, whether it conflicts with the 
international principle of sovereignty or not. In an 
effort to address these complexities the ‘duty to 
extradite’ is explored below.
The duty to extradite
Despite the sovereignty of states, states may not 
harbour criminals in their territories. International 
INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES & UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN34
law requires states to either exercise jurisdiction 
over the alleged suspects of certain categories 
of crimes22 or to extradite them to a state able 
and willing to prosecute or alternatively to 
surrender the alleged suspect to an international 
tribunal with jurisdiction over the suspect and 
the crime. Hence the existence of the phrase 
aut dedere aut judicare, which, when translated, 
literally means ‘either surrender (or deliver) or 
try (or judge)’. The obligation to prosecute or 
extradite, unlike universal jurisdiction which is 
permissive, is mandatory.23 States are obligated 
to either prosecute or extradite certain alleged 
suspects, and their failure to do so results in an 
internationally wrongful act. The case of Belgium 
v Senegal (Habre case)24 illustrates how the duty 
to prosecute is firmly emphasised in international 
law and the need to initiate a standard to assess 
compliance with the duty to prosecute by the 
custodial state. The case involved the former 
president of Chad (Hissène Habré) who during 
his time had established a brutal dictatorship 
which was responsible for the death of 
thousands of people. When proceedings were 
commenced against him, Senegal, where Habre 
was resident at the time raised the defence that 
Habre enjoyed immunity and as such could not 
be prosecuted. Belgium thereafter instituted 
proceedings against Senegal in that it violated 
its obligation to prosecute or extradite as 
pronounced by the Convention against Torture.25 
The aut dedere aut judicare maxim finds 
expression in multilateral treaties aimed at 
promoting or securing international cooperation 
in law enforcement and the suppression of 
certain criminal acts.26 Despite the difference 
in the phrasings of the obligation in different 
treaties, the obligation generally requires states 
to either extradite or prosecute alleged suspects 
of crimes of international concern in their 
domestic courts. 
Bassiouni27 extends the scope of the obligation 
to cover international crimes.28 These are crimes 
understood to be of international concern to the 
extent that warrants multilateral treaties to require 
parties to cooperate in their suppression. An 
example of a multilateral convention including an 
aut dedere aut judicare clause is the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance of 2006.29 The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court also 
places a duty on member states to surrender an 
alleged offender who is to be prosecuted by the 
ICC when located in their territories.30 In light of 
modern phenomena such as organised crime, 
money laundering, and terrorism, international 
judicial cooperation and extradition have become 
more relevant than ever before.31 The main 
purpose of the duty to extradite or prosecute 
is to ensure prosecution of alleged offenders, 
so that they do not escape with impunity. 
The scope is designed in a way that ensures 
that the perpetrators of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, genocide, torture, terrorism 
affecting the whole international community and 
transnational crimes do not go unpunished.
Generally, when states desire to prosecute an 
accused who is resident in a foreign jurisdiction 
at the time, they have recourse to bilateral 
extradition treaties. However, international 
treaties now exist which, although not devoted to 
extradition, contain provisions on extradition. The 
issue then becomes – what is the status of the 
extradition provisions in these treaties? Are they 
self-executing? If so, what happens when some 
states make reservations to these provisions?  
Provisions on extradition 
in international treaties 
and self-execution
South Africa has ratified a number of extradition 
treaties that establish extradition relations with 
the states concerned. Notable examples of 
bilateral treaties between South Africa and 
other states include the extradition treaties 
between South Africa and Lesotho, between 
South Africa and Egypt and between South 
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Africa and Argentina.32 Multilateral treaties 
to which South Africa is party include the 
Southern African Development Community 
Protocol on Extradition.33 South Africa is 
also party to a host of international treaties 
geared towards deterrence and prosecution of 
criminal activities and human rights violations. 
Although these treaties are not specifically 
devoted to extradition, they contain robust 
provisions on cooperation and extradition for 
the effective investigation and prosecution 
of persons engaged in proscribed conduct. 
Examples of such treaties are the UNCAC,34 
the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture,35 the Hague Convention of 1954 for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the event of 
armed conflict,36 the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child 
Pornography,37 the International Convention 
for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance38 and the United Nations 
Convention Against Transnational Crimes.39 
For states without extradition treaties, the 
provisions on extradition in these treaties 
are a fall-back position. For instance, under 
article 44(5) of the UNCAC, ‘[i]f a State Party… 
receives a request for extradition from another 
State Party with which it has no extradition 
treaty, it may consider this Convention the legal 
basis for extradition ...’ It has been argued that 
provisions such as these are self-executing.40 
Nevertheless, what is the status of such 
provisions in South African law? 
The debate on the status of international 
treaties in South Africa’s municipal law has 
been ongoing and has attracted both scholarly 
and jurisprudential attention. Prior to the 
decision of the case of Quagliani 2 (2009) 
profound controversy surrounded this issue. 
One line of argument suggested that some 
treaties were self-executing and as such not 
requiring domestic legislation to become part 
of municipal law.41 The other line of argument 
suggested that a legislative enactment was a 
prerequisite for extradition treaties to become 
part of South Africa’s national laws.42 This 
debate brought section 231 of the Constitution 
into perspective. This provision is as follows:
International agreements 
231. (1) The negotiating and signing 
of all international agreements is the 
responsibility of the national executive. 
(2) An international agreement binds the 
Republic only after it has been approved 
by resolution in both the National 
Assembly and the National Council of 
Provinces, unless it is an agreement 
referred to in subsection (3).
(3) An international agreement of a 
technical, administrative or executive 
nature, or an agreement which does not 
require either ratification or accession, 
entered into by the national executive, 
binds the Republic without approval by 
the National Assembly and the National 
Council of Provinces, but must be tabled 
in the Assembly and the Council within a 
reasonable time. 
(4) Any international agreement becomes 
law in the Republic when it is enacted 
into law by national legislation; but a self-
executing provision of an agreement that 
has been approved by Parliament is law in 
the Republic unless it is inconsistent with 
the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. 
The issue of whether treaties are self-executing 
in the context of South Africa in light of section 
231(4) above has attracted jurisprudential 
attention. In the 2008 case of Nello Quagliani 
v President of the RSA and Steven Mark Van 
Rooyen & Laura Brown v President of the 
RSA (Quagliani 1),43 one of the overarching 
issues was whether the extradition agreement 
between the United States of America (USA) 
and South Africa formed part of municipal law. 
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In interpreting section 231(4) of the Constitution, 
the Court disregarded the notion of self-
execution, describing it as lacking meaning 
in South Africa’s context.44 Consequently, in 
resolving the issue as to whether extradition 
treaties formed part of municipal law, the judge 
ruled that
…the plain language of the sub-section 
requires … enactment into law of every 
new treaty … that clearly means a 
new Act of Parliament for every new 
treaty. I appreciate that it will be a great 
inconvenience if there has to be a new 
act passed through Parliament for every 
international agreement … but that is what 
the Constitution said and … needs to 
be done.45
Thus, although the Extradition Act, under 
section 2(3)ter provides for notification of a 
ratified treaty in the Government Gazette,46 
such notification was deemed not to 
measure up to the requirement of a legislative 
enactment envisaged by the Constitution.47 In 
handing down this ruling, the Court effectively 
disregarded the provision of the Extradition Act, 
which envisioned that subsequent extradition 
agreements would become law on the basis of 
notification in the Gazette. 
The controversy surrounding the exact meaning 
of section 231(4) of the Constitution in regard 
to extradition treaties would, however, be far 
from being settled in the wake of this judgment. 
In a subsequent decision in the case of Steven 
William Goodwin v Director-General Department 
of Justice and Constitutional Development 
(Goodwin case),48 which also involved an 
extradition agreement between the USA and 
South Africa, the Court decided quite differently 
from Quagliani 1. Ebersohn J ruled, inter alia, 
that ‘the [extradition treaty between South 
Africa and USA] is a self-executing provision 
in its totality.’49 The crucial difference between 
these two decisions is that, whereas the latter 
considered extradition treaties as self-executing, 
the former deemed them non-self-executing. 
With these two decisions on record, the exact 
nature of extradition treaties in South Africa’s 
law remained contentious. Even scholars had 
their word on this controversy, leaving the 
issue even more perplexing. Van der Vyver, 
for instance, is of the view that the idea of 
self-execution of treaties is ‘nonsensical’ and 
ought to be ignored.50 Van de Vyver is not the 
first to hold such a view: as far back as 1951, 
Professor McDougal, in the context of the 
USA, was of the opinion that ‘this word self-
executing is essentially meaningless, and … 
the quicker we drop it in our vocabulary the 
better for clarity and understanding.’51 Katz 
contends that, ‘provisions dealing with the 
incorporation of extradition agreements appear 
not to satisfy the constitutional requirements 
concerning incorporation.’52 This conclusion 
was based on Katz’s interpretation of section 
2(3)ter of the Extradition Act, which provides 
that the Minister shall give notice of an 
agreement in the Gazette.53 In Katz’s opinion, 
since the Constitution envisages incorporation 
of international treaties by way of legislation, 
notice by the minister in terms of section 2(3)ter 
rendered the Extradition Act inconsistent with 
the Constitution.54
In 2009, the Constitutional Court pronounced 
on this controversy, seemingly settling the 
matter once and for all. In Quagliani 2 the Court 
underscored the unique nature of extradition. 
Extradition, the Court noted, ‘straddles the 
divide between state sovereignty and comity 
between states and functions at the intersection 
of domestic law and international law.’55 The 
Court alluded that under the South African 
law, ‘it is unnecessary to consider the question 
whether a treaty is self-executing.’56 Again, the 
Court appears to have avoided dealing with 
the issue, yet scholars like Botha contend, that 
‘South Africa has introduced the concept of 
self-executing treaties into its law. Therefore, like 
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it or not – and mostly it’s not – it is part of our 
law and we have to deal with it.’57 In adopting 
a stance, the Court aligned itself with views of 
scholars like van de Vyver, who (as noted above) 
take the extreme view that the notion of self-
execution is ‘nonsensical’ in the South African 
context. Thus, the Court’s point of departure 
was that extradition treaties required national 
legislative enactments to be enforceable under 
South African law.58 The Court added that, 
whether or not the Extradition Act fulfilled the 
requirement of legislative enactment in terms of 
section 231 of South Africa’s Constitution, could 
be resolved as follows:   
There are two ways in which this 
question can be answered. The first is 
to say that the Agreement itself does 
not become binding in domestic law, 
but the international obligation the 
Agreement encapsulates is given effect 
to by the provisions of the [Extradition] 
Act. The second approach is that once 
the Agreement has been entered into 
as specified in sections 2 and 3 of 
the [Extradition] Act, it becomes law 
in South Africa as contemplated by 
section 231(4) of the Constitution without 
further legislation by Parliament. It is not 
necessary for the purposes of this case 
to decide which of these approaches is 
correct, for their effect in this case is the 
same. Either the Agreement has ‘become 
law’ in South Africa as a result of the prior 
existence of the Act which constitutes the 
anticipatory enactment of the Agreement 
for the purposes of section 231(4) of 
the Constitution. Or the Agreement has 
not ‘become law’ in the Republic as 
contemplated by section 231(4) but the 
provisions of the Act are all that is required 
to give domestic effect to the international 
obligation that the Agreement creates. I 
conclude, therefore, that on either of the 
approaches identified above, no further 
enactment by Parliament is required to 
make extradition between South Africa 
and the United States permissible in South 
African law.59
The Constitutional Court, in light of the above 
ruling, reinforces the view that for an extradition 
treaty to have legal force at the national level, 
it has to draw on national legislation, which 
either gives it effect or anticipates it. National 
legislation, in this case the Extradition Act, either 
gives effect to the international obligation under 
the Extradition Agreement, or, the Extradition 
Act renders the extradition agreement ‘law.’ 
Mindful of the caveats pointed out by scholars 
like Botha on courts’ failure to deal with the self-
execution head on, it can be said that the Court 
in Quagliani 2 does not consider enactment of 
individual national legislation a requirement for 
extradition treaties entered into by South Africa 
to become part of municipal law.  
The notion of self-execution of treaties finds its 
roots in the United States, where there is also a 
fair share of controversy regarding this notion. In 
fact, some commentators find it meaningless in 
terms of its application in the USA.60 As in South 
Africa, the USA has tried to give meaning to its 
application. Notably, despite the recognition 
of self-execution, there are instances where 
domestic legislation is required for treaties 
to have effect. Examples here are where the 
treaties are vague, when the treaties make it 
explicit that legislation is required and where 
the goal that the treaty seeks to advance can 
only be advanced by a national legislation.61 
Generally, however, no legislation is required 
to give effect to self-executing treaties. The 
question then is: what is the implication of 
this current position for provisions such as 
article 44(5) of the UNCAC? Notably, amidst 
the seemingly settled stance in the decision of 
Quagliani 2 are provisions such as article 44(5) 
of the UNCAC, which give states the option 
to consider the UNCAC ‘the legal basis for 
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extradition in respect of [corruption offences 
proscribed under the UNCAC].’ In effect, in the 
absence of an extradition agreement, article 
44(5) constitutes an Extradition Agreement that 
provides the basis for imposing on state parties 
to the UNCAC an international obligation to 
extradite. Provisions similar to article 44(5) are 
also evident in other treaties, such as article 
16(5) of the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organised Crime and Protocols62 
thereto. In regard to these provisions, 
commentators like Bassiouni opine that 
whereas the other provisions of the UNCAC 
are not self-executing, article 44, specifically 
on the issue of extradition, is self-executing.63 
The fact that provisions such as article 44 are 
self-executing, Bassiouni submits, makes the 
further enactment of legislation unnecessary 
for purposes of giving the clause legal force at 
the national level.64 Bassiouni’s stance would 
appear to be contradictory to Van der Vyver, 
who views it as ‘nonsensical.’65 Bassiouni’s 
argument adds onto the concerns raised by 
commentators like Botha and Dugard who take 
the stance that the notion of self-execution as 
referred to by the Constitution should not be 
ignored.66 This leaves the question: what is the 
status of articles such as 44(5) of the UNCAC in 
South Africa’s municipal law? 
Despite the fact that scholars remain seemingly 
unsettled on the issue, the self-execution of 
extradition provisions in international treaties 
has to be measured against South Africa’s 
current stance on the notion of self-execution. 
As to whether or not South Africa would be 
required to enact national legislation to give 
effect to article 44 of the UNCAC, the decision 
of the Constitutional Court in Quagliani 2 offers 
guidance, although it has been the subject of 
criticism. Botha, for instance, finds the decision 
‘profoundly unsatisfactory’.67 Dugard adds 
that ‘the Court has given an incomprehensible 
and confusing interpretation of s 231(4) and 
failed to throw any light on the meaning of the 
term “self-executing”.’68 He insists that courts 
‘must address the meaning to self-executing 
treaties and not pretend that the proviso to s 
231(4) does not exist.’69 However, despite such 
criticism, the decision of the Constitutional 
Court remains the position under South African 
law. This means that the Extradition Act 
would be viewed either as giving effect to the 
international obligation to extradite under the 
UNCAC, or, the Extradition Act, in anticipation 
of article 44, renders article 44 of the UNCAC 
‘law’ under South African law. However, that 
a number of states have made reservations to 
article 44(5). What then is the implication of this 
for the international obligation to extradite?   
Extradition provisions in international 
treaties and reservations 
As extradition agreements between states 
are created by treaties, they are governed 
by treaty law; the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT).70 In terms of the ‘Pact 
sur servanda’ rule, as entrenched under the 
Vienna Convention, South Africa is bound by 
all treaties to which it is party and is bound to 
perform such a treaty in good faith.71 Article 27, 
which bars states from invoking provisions of 
its domestic laws as a justification for failure to 
perform an extradition treaty also bears mention 
here.72 In principle, parties to international 
treaties are bound by the obligations contained 
in those treaties. It is also important to note that 
one of the galvanizing factors for the adoption 
of the UNCAC was the commitment to facilitate 
cooperation amongst states in the prosecution 
of corruption-related crimes.73 The need for 
member states to the UNCAC to accord due 
regard to extradition is equally borne out by the 
wording of the Preamble to this treaty.74 That 
said, however, international obligations may be 
subject to some limitations, particularly where 
states make reservations to certain provisions 
of a treaty. It is explicit in article 44(5) of the 
UNCAC (as is article 16(5) of the United Nations 
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Convention Against Transnational Organised 
Crime), that making the UNCAC the basis for 
extradition is optional. Notably, article 44(5) 
provides that a state party ‘may consider’ the 
UNCAC the basis for extradition. Emphasis is 
to be placed on the term ‘may’, which suggests 
that the provision is discretionary and as such, 
states parties have the option of not making the 
UNCAC the basis for extradition. The UNCAC 
is unambiguous about the optional nature of 
article 44(5), going as far as to provide under its 
article 44(6) that:
6. A State Party that makes extradition 
conditional on the existence of a 
 treaty shall:
(a) … inform the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations whether it 
will take this Convention as the 
legal basis for cooperation on 
extradition… and
(b) If it does not take this Convention 
as the legal basis for cooperation 
on extradition, seek … to 
conclude treaties on extradition 
with other States Parties … to 
implement this article.
It is worthwhile noting that different states have 
exercised different options in regard to article 
44(6). Some have considered the UNCAC 
the basis for extradition in the absence of an 
extradition agreement, while others have opted 
out. South Africa has invoked article 44(6)(a) 
and this has had the effect of making the 
UNCAC the basis for extradition with regard 
to crimes envisaged in the UNCAC.75 This 
option is not unique to South Africa. Other 
state parties to the UNCAC have invoked a 
similar approach. Examples include Canada, 
the United States, Chile, Guatemala, Kuwait, 
Montenegro, Paraguay, Poland, Russia and 
Uruguay.76 Examples of states which have 
exercised the option not to make the UNCAC 
the basis for extradition include Bolivia, Cuba, 
El Salvador, Pakistan and Seychelles.77 Bolivia 
submits that its legal basis for extradition is 
existing extradition treaties as opposed to the 
UNCAC.78 Mauritius takes the view that ‘[t]
he Extradition Act [of Mauritius] does not at 
present allow Mauritius to take the Convention 
as the legal basis for co-operation on extradition 
with other States Parties to the Convention.’79 
Similar reservations are evident in respect of the 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organised Crime.80 So what does this mean for 
South Africa as a party to the UNCAC?
It is, of course, indisputable that in the absence 
of extradition agreements between states, 
provisions such as article 44 of the UNCAC 
constitute a basis for imposing international 
obligations on states to extradite. But does 
that international obligation bind all parties to 
the UNCAC? To answer this, recourse is made 
to the VCLT, and particularly the section on 
reservations. Article 19 of the VCLT makes 
provision for reservations unless prohibited. 
States can therefore opt out of certain obligations 
under a treaty using this mechanism. In terms of 
article 21 of the VCLT, reservations made in terms 
of Article 19 have the effect of modifying the 
obligations of the reserving state in its relations 
with other states parties to the treaty. The 
Convention, however, makes it explicit that ‘the 
reservation does not modify the provisions of the 
treaty for the other parties to the treaty inter se.’81 
When states, such as Bolivia and Mauritius, make 
reservations to article 44(5), it follows logically 
that the article has no legal obligations on them 
on extradition matters. Therefore, without an 
extradition treaty between Bolivia and South 
Africa, no obligation to extradite exists between 
these two states. This, however, as article 21 of 
the VCLT puts it, does not ‘modify the provisions’ 
of the UNCAC for other parties, which consider 
article 44(5) as the basis for extradition. 
Therefore, the fact that states are party to 
the same international treaty that makes 
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provision for extradition does not guarantee 
the existence of an international obligation to 
extradite. This position may be distinguished 
from the extradition provision under the 
Draft Comprehensive Convention Against 
International Terrorism.82 Although this 
instrument has not been adopted, it is 
particularly instructive as it puts the extradition 
provision under treaties, such as the UNCAC, 
into proper perspective. Article 18 of this Draft 
Convention generally makes provision for 
extradition. State parties have no liberty to make 
reservations to provisions on extradition in terms 
of draft article 18(5). As such all parties to the 
Convention Against International Terrorism, if 
adopted, would be placed under the obligation 
to extradite. 
Overall, the argument made in this section does 
not seek to challenge the basis for extradition 
clauses in international treaties to impose 
obligations on states. It is rather that there may 
be limitations that come with such provisions. 
Precisely put, the discussion only asks us not to 
treat extradition clauses in international treaties 
as a guarantee for extradition. Where possible, 
states that make extradition dependent on 
international agreements must remain alive to 
the need for bilateral extradition treaties. It may 
indeed be impracticable to enter into extradition 
agreements with individual states. But the 
limitations surrounding extradition clauses in 
international treaties are real and constitute 
reason for not rendering extradition agreements 
between individual states less important. 
Conclusion
Extradition is generally secured by entering into 
extradition treaties by states. Some international 
treaties containing clauses on extradition, 
though not extradition treaties per se, may 
also be relied on to have alleged offenders 
or fugitives surrendered in an event where 
the concerned states do not have extradition 
treaties with each other. This however, may be 
subject to certain limitations as discussed in 
the sections above. The fact that two states 
are party to a treaty, which has provisions on 
extradition, does not automatically establish an 
obligation to extradite. 
To comment on this article visit 
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